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Abe Fortas Resigned From the Supreme Court in 1969 Over a Paid Arrangement

How a Life magazine story about a justice's deal with a financier's foundation forced the only scandal resignation in Supreme Court history, and why today's rules still lag behind.

In early May 1969, readers who picked up Life magazine found a story that no sitting Supreme Court justice had ever faced. The reporter, William Lambert, laid out how Justice Abe Fortas had accepted a $20,000 payment from a family foundation run by Louis Wolfson, a Florida financier who was then under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The money was not a one-off. According to the arrangement the story described, the foundation was to pay Fortas $20,000 a year for the rest of his life, and then pay his widow after him. Fortas had returned the money months after taking it, and by the time the story ran Wolfson had been convicted in a securities case. None of that saved him. Within two weeks, Fortas was gone from the Court, the first and still the only justice to resign under the pressure of an ethics scandal. The odd part, looking back, is how quickly the system moved against one man and how slowly it has moved since.

In short: Abe Fortas left the Supreme Court in May 1969 after Life magazine reported his paid arrangement with a foundation tied to a financier under federal investigation. The pressure that forced him out came from the press, the Justice Department and senators of both parties. Half a century later, the justices have a written code of conduct but still no outside body that can enforce it, and that gap is the real story.

The lawyer who was the president's friend

Abe Fortas arrived on the Court in 1965 as one of the most gifted lawyers of his generation and one of the closest advisers Lyndon Johnson ever had. He grew up in Memphis, the son of a cabinetmaker, went to Yale Law School, worked in the New Deal government, and then built a powerful Washington law firm. He also argued, without a fee, the case that became Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the Court held in 1963 that states must provide a lawyer to criminal defendants who cannot afford one. Every public defender's office in the country traces part of its lineage to that argument.

Johnson persuaded Fortas to take Arthur Goldberg's seat, partly by moving Goldberg to the United Nations. It was a classic Johnson maneuver, and it carried the seed of the later trouble. Fortas never really stopped being the president's counselor. While he sat on the Court he kept advising Johnson on policy and politics, a habit that would have shocked almost nobody in Washington and should have worried almost everyone.

In 1968, with Earl Warren planning to retire, Johnson nominated Fortas to be chief justice. The nomination ran into a buzz saw. Senators objected to his rulings, to his continued role in the White House, and to a fee of about $15,000 he had accepted to teach a summer seminar at American University, money that had been raised from business figures with interests that could come before the Court. Opponents mounted a filibuster, the effort to end debate failed, and Fortas asked Johnson to withdraw the nomination in October 1968. He stayed on as an associate justice. Remember the seminar fee; it was the first public sign of a pattern that the Wolfson story would make impossible to ignore.

What Life magazine found

The Wolfson arrangement dated to the beginning of 1966, shortly after Fortas joined the Court. Wolfson was a wealthy industrialist who had run into trouble with securities regulators. His foundation agreed to pay Fortas an annual sum, and Fortas accepted the first payment. Later that year, as Wolfson's legal problems deepened, Fortas sent the money back.

What made the story explosive was not only the sum, which was large for the time, but the shape of it. A lifetime retainer from a man with live federal trouble looks like exactly what ethics rules exist to prevent: a private person with business before the government putting a justice on a kind of salary. Fortas said he had done nothing for Wolfson in any case, and there is no public evidence that he ever intervened in Wolfson's legal matters. But the defense missed the point that undid him. The question was never only whether a deal had changed a ruling. It was whether the public could trust that it had not.

Soon after the story ran, Attorney General John Mitchell went to see Chief Justice Warren privately and brought more material about the arrangement. The Nixon administration, which had every political reason to want a Johnson appointee off the bench, pressed hard. Members of Congress began talking openly about impeachment. Fortas sent his resignation letter to the White House in mid-May 1969 and announced it publicly the next day, still insisting he had done nothing wrong.

Why the pressure worked so fast

It helps to be clear-eyed about the politics here, because they cut more than one way. The Nixon Justice Department did not chase Fortas out of pure civic spirit. Removing him handed the new president a second seat to fill in his first year, on top of Warren's. Some of Fortas's Senate critics were furious about the Warren Court's decisions on civil rights and criminal procedure and would have welcomed any excuse.

And yet the outcome was right on the merits, and that is worth saying plainly from the progressive side, since Fortas was one of ours. A justice taking an annual payment from a financier under investigation is indefensible no matter who appointed him. Several Democrats in the Senate said as much. The press did its job: a reporter followed documents, a magazine printed them, and a public that read the story found it intolerable.

The speed came from three forces lining up at once. There was a credible threat of impeachment, which Congress has never actually used to remove a justice but which still carried weight. There was an executive branch with documents and the will to use them. And there was a political culture in which a justice caught in an arrangement like this was expected to leave, not to dig in and wait out the news cycle. Take away any one of those and the story ends differently.

The aftermath that followed

The Fortas affair kicked off one of the strangest stretches in the Court's history. Nixon nominated Clement Haynsworth of South Carolina for the Fortas seat. The Senate rejected him in November 1969, and one of the main complaints against him concerned his rulings in cases involving companies in which he held financial interests. Democrats who had just watched their own justice fall were not going to wave through a nominee with conflict questions of his own. Nixon's next choice, G. Harrold Carswell, was rejected in 1970 over his record on civil rights and doubts about his qualifications. The seat finally went to Harry Blackmun, who was confirmed without opposition.

The rules shifted too. In 1974 Congress tightened the federal law that tells judges when they must step aside from a case, moving it toward a standard based on whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In 1978 the Ethics in Government Act, written in the shadow of Watergate, required federal judges, including the justices, to file annual financial disclosure reports. A justice in Fortas's position today would have to list outside income on a public form. That is real progress, and it came directly from the scandals of that decade.

The standards then and now

Here is the comparison the episode invites. In 1969, the mere existence of a paid arrangement with a man in legal trouble ended a career within days. In the 2020s, reporting by ProPublica and other outlets described years of luxury travel and other benefits that Justice Clarence Thomas received from the Texas billionaire Harlan Crow, much of it not disclosed at the time, and a fishing trip to Alaska that Justice Samuel Alito took with a hedge-fund founder whose firm later had business before the Court. Both justices have defended themselves. Thomas has said he was advised that the hospitality of close personal friends did not need to be reported. Alito wrote that he did not think the trip had to be disclosed and that he did not know of the later case connections at the time he decided not to recuse.

It is fair to give those defenses their full weight. The rules on gifts and hospitality were vague for years, and the Judicial Conference clarified the reporting requirements for some kinds of travel in 2023. Friendship is not corruption. Wealthy friends of judges are not new. And nobody has shown that any of these benefits changed a vote.

Here's the argument from where we stand, though. The Fortas lesson was never about proving a bought vote. It was about appearance, because appearance is all the public can see. A court has no army and no budget of its own; it runs on the belief that its rulings come from law rather than from the people who pay for the vacation. What has changed since 1969 is not that justices became less honest. It is that the informal enforcement that worked against Fortas has collapsed. Impeachment of a justice is unthinkable in a divided Senate. A Justice Department will not lean on a justice whose votes the administration likes. And the expectation that an embarrassed justice steps aside or steps down has faded into a norm of saying nothing and waiting.

In November 2023, after months of pressure, the Court published its first formal code of conduct. It was a meaningful step, and it is right to say so. But the code leaves each justice to decide alone whether to step aside from a case, and there is no outside body that can investigate a complaint or enforce a rule. Lower federal judges have such a process. The nine most powerful judges in the country do not.

The reform debate, fairly stated

Proposals to change this fall into a few families. Some would require the Court to adopt an enforceable code with a mechanism for complaints, perhaps a panel of lower-court judges. Some would tighten disclosure and gift rules by statute. Some would require a justice who declines to recuse to explain the decision in writing. Bills along these lines have been introduced in Congress in recent years, and a Senate committee advanced one in 2023, but none has become law.

The strongest objection deserves a straight answer. Critics argue that Congress cannot write rules for a coequal branch without violating the separation of powers, and that an enforcement panel could be weaponized by partisans to harass justices whose rulings they dislike. Chief Justice John Roberts has suggested that the Court can handle its own ethics. Those are serious points. A rule that let a few angry senators trigger endless investigations would be bad for everyone, including future progressive justices.

The answer is that Congress already does a great deal of this without anyone calling it unconstitutional. It sets the Court's size, its budget, its appellate jurisdiction and the disclosure rules the justices already follow under the 1978 law. A carefully built enforcement process, run by judges rather than politicians, with a high bar for complaints, can protect against harassment and still give the public somewhere to turn. The alternative is the system we have now, in which the only remedy is the one that worked in 1969 and no longer works at all.

There is also a point progressives should hold ourselves to. Ethics rules only count if they apply to justices we like. The Fortas episode is a good test: a liberal justice took money he should not have taken, and the right outcome was that he left. Any code worth backing has to be one we would accept if it caught a justice appointed by a Democrat. If we cannot say that, the public will rightly hear our ethics push as a power play.

A story about trust, not one man

It is easy to treat Fortas as a tragic figure, and in a way he was. A brilliant lawyer from modest beginnings, he did work that still protects poor defendants every day. He went back to private practice after his resignation, though not to his old firm, and died in 1982. The arrangement that ended his time on the Court did not need to happen. He simply did not believe the rules applied to someone with his talents and his friends.

That belief is the real danger in every era, and it is not partisan. The fix is not finding better people, because the people will always be human. The fix is building rules that do not depend on any one justice's good judgment, rules that a cabinetmaker's son from Memphis and a billionaire's friend from anywhere would have to follow the same way. Families who go to court over a lost home, a denied benefit or a polluted creek deserve to know that the judge across the room answers to the law and to nothing else.

What you can do

  • Follow the Court's work directly. The court-watch page lists this term's Supreme Court opinions with the Court's own summaries, the emergency docket and Senate votes on judges, so you can see what the justices decide rather than only what is said about them.
  • Read up on the wider fight over the judiciary on our topic page about the courts, which gathers coverage of nominations, ethics and rulings.
  • Tell your members of Congress where you stand on an enforceable ethics code for the Supreme Court. Our representatives page needs only your address to show who speaks for you in Congress, how to reach them by phone or form, and what they voted on lately.
  • Look at the financial disclosure reports the justices already file each year, which are released publicly by the federal judiciary. Reading one yourself is the best way to see what the forms capture and what they leave out.
  • Support groups that work on court transparency and the rule of law in your state; the organizations directory lists nonprofits by cause in every state.

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