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Black Farmers, the Department of Agriculture and the Pigford Settlement
In 1999 a federal judge approved a settlement over decades of USDA lending bias against Black farmers. What the case found, why payments came so slowly, and what is still owed.
In April 1999, in a federal courtroom in Washington, Judge Paul Friedman approved a settlement in a case called Pigford v. Glickman. The defendant was the Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, standing in for the department he ran. The lead plaintiff was Timothy Pigford, a Black farmer from North Carolina. The settlement was, at the time, described as the largest civil rights settlement in American history. In his opinion approving it, Friedman wrote that the government had, for decades, discriminated against Black farmers in the very programs meant to help small farmers survive. The money that followed was real. So was the frustration, because many of the people the settlement was meant to help never collected a dollar, and by the time the system was fixed, many of them had died or lost their land.
In short: For much of the twentieth century, county offices of the Department of Agriculture denied or delayed loans and aid to Black farmers far more than to white farmers, and the department's own complaint system collapsed for years. The 1999 Pigford settlement and a 2010 follow-up paid out billions, but tight deadlines and paperwork kept many farmers out. Black land loss continued, and the fight over repair is not over.
From nearly a million farms to a sliver
The scale of the loss is the place to start. In 1920, the census counted close to a million Black farmers in the United States, most of them in the South, many of them tenants or sharecroppers but a substantial number owning their land outright. Today, Black farmers make up well under two percent of the country's farmers. Some of that decline reflects changes that hit all small farmers: mechanization, consolidation, and the long migration of rural Americans to cities. But Black farmers left the land faster and in greater proportion than white farmers, and the reasons were not only economic.
In 1982, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published a report titled "The Decline of Black Farming in America." It warned that Black-operated farms were disappearing at a rate that threatened their near-total extinction, and it pointed to the Department of Agriculture's own programs as part of the problem. The report noted that USDA lending and assistance programs had not served Black farmers fairly. It was not the last such warning.
How discrimination worked at the county office
To understand the case, you need to understand where the department's power touched farmers' lives. The USDA ran, and still runs, a network of local offices across rural America. For decades, the critical decisions on farm loans, disaster payments and other assistance were made by county committees, locally elected boards that were overwhelmingly white in the South, and by local loan officers who answered to them.
That structure gave individual officials enormous discretion. A farmer who needed an operating loan in spring to buy seed and fertilizer had to get it on time; a loan approved in July is useless for a crop that had to be planted in April. The pattern farmers described, and the record in Pigford reflected, was not usually an outright written rule. It was delay, lost paperwork, smaller loans than requested, loans with stricter supervision, and denials that white neighbors in similar circumstances did not receive. A farmer who missed one planting season could fall behind on debts; behind on debts, he could lose equipment; without equipment, he could lose the farm.
Here is the detail that turned a pattern into a lawsuit. Farmers who believed they had been treated unfairly were supposed to file complaints with the USDA's civil rights office. In the early 1980s, during the Reagan administration, that complaint-processing function was effectively dismantled, and for more than a decade complaints went largely uninvestigated. Farmers filed complaints that simply sat. When the department later acknowledged the breakdown, it created a problem and an opening: the statute of limitations had run on many claims, but the government's own failure to process complaints was the reason. Congress eventually waived the limitations period for these discrimination complaints, clearing the way for the class action.
Why a late loan can sink a farm
People who have never farmed sometimes underestimate how much depends on timing, so it helps to walk through a single year. A farmer growing row crops in the South typically needs cash in late winter for seed, fertilizer, fuel and equipment repairs. That money usually comes from an operating loan, repaid after harvest. For small farmers who could not get credit from commercial banks, the federal government was the lender of last resort; for much of the period in the Pigford case, that lender was the Farmers Home Administration, whose functions were folded into the new Farm Service Agency in 1994.
Now imagine the loan arrives two months late. The farmer plants late, or plants fewer acres, or skips fertilizer. Yields fall. Revenue at harvest falls with them, and so does the ability to repay last year's loan. The next application then looks riskier on paper, which justifies another delay or a smaller loan. After a few seasons, the farmer is in default, and the government, which is both lender and creditor, can foreclose on the land and equipment it financed.
At no point in that chain does anyone need to write down a discriminatory rule. A clerk who processes one farmer's file promptly and lets another sit for weeks can, over a decade, decide which family keeps its land. Discretion, exercised unevenly and repeated across thousands of files, does the work a written rule would have done. That is why the Pigford claims focused on comparisons: how a Black farmer's application was handled compared with similarly situated white neighbors in the same county.
It also explains why the harm compounds. A farm is not only a business but usually a family's main asset and often its home. Losing it means losing the wealth that would have passed to the next generation, along with the knowledge and skills that came with working the land. When advocates talk about Black land loss, they mean a loss that keeps growing long after the foreclosure sale.
The 1999 settlement and its two tracks
The settlement Friedman approved, a consent decree, created a two-track system for claims.
Track A offered a faster, simpler process. A farmer who could show, by a relatively low standard of proof, that he farmed or tried to farm, applied for a USDA program, was treated less favorably than white farmers, and suffered as a result, would receive a fixed payment of $50,000 plus relief from certain USDA debts and tax relief. Most claimants chose this track.
Track B allowed farmers with stronger documentation to seek larger damages, but required more proof and went before an arbitrator. Fewer claimants used it, and fewer succeeded.
The design made sense on paper. Many farmers did not have decades-old records; Track A's lower burden was meant to accommodate that. And for thousands of farmers, the payments mattered. Over the following years, the first Pigford settlement paid out on the order of a billion dollars in cash and debt relief.
Why so many were left out
The trouble was the deadline. The decree gave claimants a limited window to file, and then a short extended period for late claims with a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Tens of thousands of farmers filed after the deadline. Many said they had not known about the settlement, because outreach in rural areas was weak, or that they had been confused by the process. Most of those late claims were rejected without being heard on the merits.
Critics at the time, including Black farmers' advocacy groups, argued that the class counsel and the court had not done enough to reach people, and that a settlement for the most isolated farmers in the country could not depend on finding out about a deadline from a newspaper notice. Defenders replied that some deadline was necessary, that the settlement had to close eventually, and that the late-claim provision was a reasonable attempt at flexibility. Both points have force. The outcome, though, was that a remedy meant for people failed by a system often failed them again for procedural reasons.
Congress responded. The 2008 Farm Bill included a provision allowing people whose claims had been denied as late to file new claims in federal court. Those suits were consolidated, and in 2010 the government settled them in what became known as Pigford II, providing $1.25 billion for the claims. Congress appropriated the money in the Claims Settlement Act of 2010, which President Obama signed that December. The second round also drew criticism, including allegations from some in Congress that it was vulnerable to fraudulent claims; supporters pointed to the screening process built into it. Payments under Pigford II went out in the following years.
A third round, and a fight over race-conscious relief
The story did not end there. In 2021, Congress included in the American Rescue Plan a provision to pay off USDA loans for "socially disadvantaged" farmers, a category that included Black, Hispanic, Native American and Asian American farmers. White farmers sued, arguing that awarding relief by race violated the Constitution. Federal courts blocked the program before it paid out.
In 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act repealed that provision and replaced it with a different approach: $2.2 billion for financial assistance to farmers who had experienced discrimination in USDA lending programs before 2021, decided by individual application rather than by race. The department announced payments under that program in 2024.
This sequence is a compact lesson in how race-conscious remedies fare in current courts. The opponents' argument was straightforward and, in the Supreme Court's present reading of equal protection, powerful: the government should not distribute benefits by race. The answer from advocates was that the relief was aimed at a specific, documented history of discrimination by the very agency involved. The courts were not persuaded, and Congress shifted to a discrimination-based test that required each farmer to show their own harm. That shift kept relief flowing but also meant more paperwork, more delay and more people who could not document what happened to them decades ago.
The corporate turn in American farming
There is a larger frame here, and it connects to fights well beyond race. American agriculture has consolidated dramatically. Fewer, larger farms produce most of the country's food, and a small number of companies dominate meatpacking, seed, fertilizer and grain trading. Small farmers of every background face pressure from this concentration: fewer buyers for what they produce, higher prices for what they need, and less bargaining power.
Black farmers entered this era already weakened by decades of unequal access to credit, which is the oxygen of farming. The farms that survived consolidation tended to be the ones that could borrow to expand. Unequal lending, in other words, did not only hurt individual families; it shaped who would own American agriculture as it concentrated. When progressives talk about corporate power in the food system, the history of the county loan office belongs in the conversation.
It is also worth noting a point of agreement across party lines. Rural Republicans and urban Democrats have both supported measures to help small and beginning farmers, protect against packer abuses and expand access to credit. Some of the most useful farm-policy reforms have passed with bipartisan votes. Black farmers' advocates have often built coalitions with white family farmers who share their frustration with concentration and with distant institutions.
What still needs doing
The settlements paid real money and admitted real wrongs. They did not return most of the land. A farm lost in the 1980s was often sold, consolidated into a larger operation or developed, and cannot be recovered with a check. Advocates have proposed further steps: land-access programs that help new and returning Black farmers buy land, better outreach and technical help at USDA, stronger civil rights enforcement inside the department, and independent oversight of local decisions. Each of these is debated, and some face the same legal challenges that blocked race-based debt relief. Programs designed around documented discrimination, geographic need or beginning-farmer status are on firmer ground. Whatever form they take, they will work only if the department fixes the problem at the root of Pigford: a complaint system that farmers can trust to answer them.
What you can do
Farm policy is written in Congress and carried out in county offices. Both can hear from you.
- Comment on USDA rules. When the department proposes changes to farm loans, civil rights procedures or assistance programs, the public can comment. Find open federal rules and guidance on our comment page.
- Reach the people writing the next Farm Bill. Find your senators and representative, their contact forms and their latest votes on our representatives page.
- Support farmer and land-justice organizations. Our organizations directory lists civil rights, food and legal aid groups by state, including many working with rural communities.
- Follow the concentration fight. Our corporate power topic page gathers reporting on monopolies and consolidation, including in food and agriculture.
Timothy Pigford's name is on a case that changed federal policy. Thousands of other farmers whose names are on no case at all lost their land one delayed loan at a time. Remembering them is part of the debt. Paying it is the rest.