Blog
Border Security and Asylum: The Strongest Arguments on Each Side
The best security case and the best humanitarian case on asylum, set out fairly, using the bipartisan 2024 Senate border bill as a test of where the two could meet.
On the evening of Sunday, February 4, 2024, three senators who agreed on almost nothing released the text of a bill they had spent months negotiating. James Lankford was a conservative Republican from Oklahoma and a former Baptist youth camp director. Chris Murphy was a Connecticut Democrat best known for his work on gun violence. Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona had left the Democratic Party and sat as an independent. Their bill was the border section of a larger package that also carried aid for Ukraine and Israel, and it contained things each side had wanted for years and things each side's base hated. Three days later, on February 7, the Senate voted on whether to move forward. The motion failed, 49 to 50. Former President Trump, then the presumptive Republican nominee, had urged Republicans to oppose it, and most did. Some progressive Democrats voted no as well. The bill that both parties' negotiators had shaped died before it was debated, and the arguments it tried to reconcile have only grown louder since.
In short: The strongest security argument holds that an asylum system overwhelmed by claims, most of which do not succeed, invites more crossings and loses public consent. The strongest humanitarian argument holds that asylum is a legal promise to people fleeing persecution, and that shutting the door returns some of them to danger. The 2024 Senate bill showed that a compromise was writable; its failure showed that the politics of the border often reward the fight more than the fix.
What the bill tried to do
It helps to know what was actually on the table, because both camps described it in ways the text did not always support.
The bill would have created a new emergency border authority. When the average number of encounters with migrants between ports of entry reached a set level over a week, roughly 5,000 a day, the Department of Homeland Security would have been required to close the border to most asylum claims between ports, while keeping a limited number of claims at official crossings. At a lower level, the secretary could choose to use it.
It would have raised the bar for the first screening of asylum claims, known as the credible fear interview, so that fewer weak claims passed through to years-long court cases. It would have let trained asylum officers, rather than backlogged immigration courts, decide many cases much faster. It provided money for more Border Patrol agents, asylum officers, immigration judges and detection equipment for fentanyl at ports. And it would have given asylum seekers who passed screening the ability to work sooner, which helps cities that had been struggling to house new arrivals.
Supporters on the right said it was the toughest border bill in decades. Critics on the right said its emergency trigger effectively accepted thousands of crossings a day as normal. Critics on the left said it gutted asylum protections and revived the logic of turning people away. Many Latino Democrats, including members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, opposed it for that reason.
The strongest security case
Here is the security argument at its strongest, in terms its best advocates would recognize.
Asylum has become the main door, not an exception. The asylum system was built for people persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. It was not built for people fleeing poverty or general violence, however real their suffering. When large numbers of migrants who do not meet that legal standard apply anyway, the system becomes a way to enter and stay for years while cases wait, because the backlog in immigration court stretches that long.
Incentives drive flows. If people learn that crossing and claiming asylum leads to release and years of work, more will come, and smuggling organizations will sell that promise. Policies that end that expectation reduce crossings, which reduces deaths in the desert and the river and the profits of cartels.
Public consent matters. A generous immigration system depends on voters believing the government is in control. When border towns, shelters and big-city budgets are visibly overwhelmed, support for all immigration falls, including for refugees and legal immigrants. Order is the precondition for generosity.
Results. Security advocates point out that crossings fell sharply after the Biden administration restricted asylum by proclamation in June 2024, and fell much further in 2025 under the Trump administration's far more sweeping measures. To them, this proves that policy, not root causes alone, determines how many people come.
This is a serious argument. Some of it is simply correct: incentives do matter, the court backlog has been enormous, and public trust is fragile.
The strongest humanitarian case
Now the humanitarian argument, at its strongest.
Asylum is a legal promise, not a favour. After the Second World War, when countries turned away Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazis, the world agreed that people fleeing persecution should not be sent back to it. The United States wrote that commitment into its own law in the Refugee Act of 1980. U.S. law says a person who arrives in the country, whether at a port or between ports, may apply for asylum. A rule that shuts asylum when numbers are high treats the promise as conditional on convenience.
A screening standard is a life-or-death filter. Raising the bar at the first interview, held quickly, often without a lawyer and sometimes in a language the person barely speaks, will screen out some people who would have won their full case. Every system makes errors; this one's errors send people back to those they fled.
Deterrence moves people, not need. Harsh policies do lower crossings at a given place and time, but they push migrants toward more dangerous routes, longer waits in border cities where kidnapping and extortion are common, and smugglers who charge more. The people with real claims are among those most harmed.
Legal pathways work. When the government expanded legal routes, such as parole programs that let people with U.S. sponsors fly in after vetting, many people used them instead of crossing. The humanitarian case is not for an open border but for orderly, lawful ways to seek protection, combined with fast and fair decisions.
This is also a serious argument, and it, too, is partly correct: errors at screening are real, and legal pathways did reduce some crossings.
It also has a weakness its champions should face. A promise of protection that takes five years to keep is not much of a promise, and it is badly exposed to the charge that people use the wait itself as the benefit. Humanitarian advocates who resist every effort to speed decisions, including fair ones, leave the system open to exactly the abuse their opponents describe. Defending asylum means defending a version of it that actually reaches a decision.
Where the two arguments actually meet
Read side by side, the two cases agree on more than their champions admit.
Both want fast decisions. The security side wants weak claims rejected quickly; the humanitarian side wants strong claims granted quickly instead of leaving people in limbo for years. That points to the same remedy: many more asylum officers and immigration judges, which is exactly what the 2024 bill funded.
Both dislike smugglers, and both should want legal pathways that compete with them.
Both say they want order. The disagreement is over whether order comes mainly from closing doors or from building working ones.
And both, if pressed, accept that some people will be turned away. The security side does not claim that nobody deserves protection, and the humanitarian side does not claim that everyone does. The real argument is about how to sort the two groups quickly, accurately and without cruelty, which is a question of staffing, standards and money more than of principle. Framed that way, it is the kind of question Congress is built to answer.
Here is this post's view, and it is an opinion: the most durable answer is a well-funded system that decides cases in months, deports people who lose after a fair hearing, protects those who win, and offers legal routes for workers and families, so that the asylum door is used for asylum. Progressives should own the "deports people who lose" part honestly; a system that never removes anyone will not keep public support. Conservatives should own the "fair hearing" and "legal routes" parts; a system that only shuts doors eventually breaks the law it claims to enforce and pushes desperate people to more dangerous crossings.
Why the deal died, and what that teaches
The 2024 bill failed mostly because of timing and politics, not because its ideas were unworkable. Many Republicans decided that passing a bipartisan border bill in an election year would hand President Biden a win on an issue they believed favoured them. Some Democrats thought the bill went too far. A second attempt in May 2024 also failed.
Lawmakers who believed in the bill paid a price for it. Lankford, the Republican negotiator, was censured by his state party in January 2024, before the text was even public. It is worth remembering that he finished the work anyway.
In 2025, the governing approach shifted entirely. The Trump administration suspended most asylum access at the southern border by proclamation, an action challenged in federal court, and Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which expanded mandatory detention for people charged with certain crimes, with some Democratic votes. Large new funding for enforcement followed in the July 2025 budget law. None of those steps created the faster, fairer asylum process that both sides had once said they wanted.
With Democrats taking control of both chambers in the new Congress on January 3, 2027, the question returns. A Democratic Congress facing a Republican president will have to decide whether to try for a bipartisan deal again, and what it would give and demand. That fight will be visible vote by vote.
How the asylum system got here
Neither argument makes full sense without the history of how the system grew into its present shape, because each side is reacting to a different chapter of it.
The modern framework dates to the Refugee Act of 1980, which brought U.S. law in line with international refugee standards and created a formal asylum process for people already in the country or at its border. For years, the system handled modest numbers of claims, many of them from people fleeing Central American civil wars in the 1980s, often under policies that were themselves accused of political bias.
The 1996 immigration overhaul added the machinery that still frames today's debate. It created expedited removal, allowing officers to deport certain people at the border without a hearing, and the credible fear interview, a screening step for those who say they fear return. If someone passes that interview, their full claim goes to an immigration judge. The design assumed most arrivals would be single adults from Mexico who could be quickly returned, and that relatively few would claim fear.
Over the following decades, the people arriving changed. More came from Central America, then from much farther away, and more came as families and children, many of them seeking asylum rather than trying to avoid detection. The credible fear screen, meant to be a quick sieve, became the main entrance to a court system that was never funded to handle the flow. The backlog in immigration court grew into the millions of cases, and waits of several years for a hearing became common.
Each administration tried something. The first Trump administration narrowed which kinds of persecution qualified, including a 2018 attorney general decision limiting claims based on domestic or gang violence, later reversed, and made many asylum seekers wait in Mexico for their hearings. In March 2020, citing the pandemic, the government began expelling most migrants at the border under a public health authority known as Title 42, which ended in May 2023. The Biden administration paired new legal pathways with a rule presuming many people ineligible for asylum if they crossed between ports without first seeking protection elsewhere, and later the June 2024 proclamation.
Read this way, the security side is responding to a system where a screening step became a door, and the humanitarian side is responding to a series of policies that tried to close that door without building a working one. Both are describing something real. The difference is which failure they see first.
What you can do
- Read the votes for yourself. The Congress votes and bills page records how members voted, and the bills both parties passed together show where cross-party deals have actually happened.
- Tell your members what you would trade. Use the representatives lookup to call your House member and senators. Be specific: do you support more asylum officers and judges? Legal pathways? Limits on the emergency authority? Members hear far less from constituents with concrete positions than from those who simply want them to "do something."
- Follow the new majority's choices. The Democrats in Congress topic page tracks what the party proposes once the new Congress is seated.
- Support people in the process. Asylum seekers face long cases, often without lawyers. Legal aid groups and shelters near the border and in receiving cities are listed in the organizations directory.
The three senators of February 2024 proved that a bill can be written across the widest divide in American politics. Passing one takes something else: enough voters on each side who would rather have the fix than the fight.