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Election Workers Are Quitting, and Protecting Them Protects Every Voter

Threats drove experienced election officials out after 2020. The case for specific protections, from address privacy to criminal penalties, and why they protect every voter.

On June 21, 2022, the House committee investigating the January 6 attack held a hearing that turned out to be less about the Capitol than about the people who run elections. The witnesses included Rusty Bowers, the Republican speaker of the Arizona House, and two Georgia Republicans from the secretary of state's office, Brad Raffensperger and Gabriel Sterling. Then came Wandrea "Shaye" Moss, a former election worker from Fulton County, Georgia, who had spent years helping voters, many of them elderly, with their absentee ballots. After the 2020 election, she and her mother, Ruby Freeman, a temporary election worker, had been falsely accused of fraud in clips of video spread by the president's lawyers and allies. Moss described the threats that followed, the people who showed up at her grandmother's house, the way she stopped giving her name in public. Her mother's recorded testimony described having nowhere she felt safe. None of the people at that hearing had chosen public life in any ordinary sense. They had chosen to count.

In short: After 2020, election officials and workers across the country faced threats and harassment, and many experienced ones left. Here is the argument: specific, bipartisan protections, such as address confidentiality, clear criminal penalties, security funding and support for local offices, protect not just the workers but every voter who depends on them.

It is worth noticing what the hearing did not include: any evidence that these workers had done anything wrong. Every claim made against them had been investigated by Georgia officials, Republicans among them, and found to be false. The harm came anyway, which tells you something about how threats work. They do not wait for facts.

Who the targets were

Most Americans picture an election official, if they picture one at all, as a distant figure. In practice, the people who run elections are mostly county clerks, deputy registrars, temporary workers and volunteers. In many small counties, a single clerk handles elections along with marriage licenses and property records. They are Republicans, Democrats and independents. They are often retirees. Their names are frequently public, and in small places so are their homes.

After 2020, those names became targets. Freeman and Moss were accused, falsely, of counting suitcases of fraudulent ballots; Georgia investigators reviewed the video and found ordinary ballot processing. The accusations nonetheless spread widely, and the threats followed. In December 2023 a federal jury in Washington ordered Rudy Giuliani to pay the two women about $148 million for defaming them. The size of that verdict reflects how serious the damage to two private citizens was.

Sterling had seen it coming. On December 1, 2020, after a young contractor working on Georgia's voting system received threats, he stood at a lectern in the state Capitol and warned that the rhetoric had to stop. "Someone's going to get hurt, someone's going to get shot, someone's going to get killed," he said. He was a Republican speaking to leaders of his own party.

What the surveys found

The threats were not isolated. Surveys of local election officials conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice in the years after 2020 found that large shares reported threats, harassment or abuse because of their jobs, and many said they knew colleagues who had left because of it. Reports from states as different as Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Nevada described experienced officials retiring early or resigning. In some counties, nearly the entire senior election staff turned over within a few years.

The Justice Department created an Election Threats Task Force in 2021 to investigate and prosecute threats against election workers. It brought cases, some of which ended in prison sentences, but the number of prosecutions was small relative to the volume of threats reported, in part because many threatening messages fall short of what federal law treats as a criminal threat.

Why turnover is a risk to voters

Here is where the question needs reframing. The usual framing is sympathy: these people were treated badly, and that is wrong. True. But the stronger reason to act is self-interest, for every voter of every party.

Running an election is a skilled job. A clerk with fifteen years of experience knows which polling places flood, which precincts run short of ballots, how to read the state's election code, how to test equipment, how to handle a provisional ballot correctly. When that person leaves, their replacement has to learn it in the middle of an election cycle. New officials make more mistakes, through no fault of their own. Mistakes produce long lines, misprinted ballots, delayed counts and, sometimes, lawsuits. And every mistake becomes fuel for the next round of suspicion and threats.

There is a second risk. When the experienced professionals leave, the jobs sometimes go to people who arrive with a mission to prove the last election was stolen. A system that has driven out its most knowledgeable defenders is easier to manipulate, from inside, by people who do not believe in the rules they are supposed to follow. Protecting election workers is a way of protecting the integrity people across the spectrum say they care about.

The other side's strongest objection

Some conservatives object to new protections on free-speech grounds, and the concern deserves a careful answer. Criticizing election officials is protected speech. Demanding answers at a county meeting, filing records requests, observing the count, suing over a procedure, questioning a decision in harsh language: all of this is legitimate, and a law that punished it would be wrong and unconstitutional.

The answer is to write laws aimed at conduct, not opinion. A true threat of violence is not protected speech under long-standing Supreme Court precedent. Publishing someone's home address with the intent to incite harassment can be prohibited. Interfering with an official's duties through intimidation can be a crime. Good laws in this area draw those lines clearly and leave criticism alone. Progressives should insist on the same precision, because laws that sweep too broadly will eventually be used against their own protests.

A second objection is that existing law already covers threats. Partly true. But federal and state threat statutes were not written with election workers in mind, investigators have not always treated threats against a county clerk as seriously as threats against a judge, and many states had no protection at all for election workers' home addresses. Filling those gaps is not a new category of speech crime; it is extending protections that already exist for other public servants.

What specific protections look like

A number of states, including Colorado and Maine, passed laws after 2020 strengthening protections for election workers, and others followed with their own versions. The approaches fall into a few categories.

  1. Address confidentiality. Let election officials and workers keep their home addresses off public records, as many states already allow for judges, police and domestic violence survivors.
  2. Clear criminal penalties. Make it a specific crime to threaten or intimidate an election worker because of their duties, with penalties that reflect the threat to the election itself.
  3. Anti-doxxing provisions. Prohibit publishing an election worker's personal information with intent to cause harassment or harm.
  4. Security funding. Pay for physical security at election offices and counting centers, training for staff, and in some cases security for officials who face credible threats. The federal Election Assistance Commission has allowed some election-security grant money to be used this way.
  5. Interference with certification. Make clear that refusing to certify results as the law requires, or pressuring officials to alter results, carries consequences.
  6. Support and pay. Fund local election offices adequately, so experienced staff are paid enough to stay and new staff can be trained before elections, not during them.

None of these is radical. Most have passed in at least one state with support from both parties. Federal legislation has been proposed in recent Congresses to provide similar protections nationally; with Democrats taking control of both chambers in January 2027, some version could return, though whether it passes, and in what form, is uncertain.

Funding deserves its own emphasis. Elections in the United States are run mostly on county budgets, and they compete with roads, jails and sheriffs for money. Federal support arrives irregularly, often in single grants tied to a crisis. Steady, predictable federal and state funding for election administration would let counties plan, hire and train instead of scrambling every two years, and it would make every other protection on this list easier to deliver.

The crossing of party lines

The June 2022 hearing is worth remembering for who was in the chair and who was in the witness seat. The committee included two Republicans. Bowers described protesters outside his home and his refusal to break the law despite pressure from the president's team; he lost his next primary. Raffensperger and Sterling described the pressure on them and the threats to their families and staff. Moss and Freeman were ordinary public servants who had done their jobs.

The protection of election workers is one of the few issues where the people most threatened came from both parties and the people who defended them did too. Progressives make that coalition stronger by giving credit where it is due. The Republicans who refused to bend in 2020 paid a political price, and they deserve to be treated as allies on this question, not as foils.

The people who stay

Despite everything, most election workers kept working. Many counties have rebuilt their staffs, and some have seen a surge of new volunteers, including younger people, who signed up precisely because they saw what happened to the ones before them. That is the most hopeful fact in this story. Elections in the United States are run by neighbours. They will keep being run by neighbours as long as enough of us are willing to sit at the table and enough of us are willing to defend the ones who do.

What it is like inside a small office

National stories about threats tend to focus on the officials whose names became famous. The quieter story is in the thousands of small and mid-sized counties where one or two people run every election.

Think about what the job demands even in a calm year. The clerk orders ballots months in advance, proofreads every candidate's name, recruits and trains poll workers, many of them retirees who must be replaced as they age out, finds polling places that meet accessibility rules, tests equipment, manages mail ballots, answers phone calls from confused voters, and then works long days through the count and the canvass. Pay for these positions is often modest, and in many places the job comes with no dedicated security budget at all.

Now add a steady stream of hostile emails and calls, records requests filed in bulk, people filming staff in parking lots, and occasional messages that cross into explicit threats. Even when no one is hurt, the effect is cumulative. Staff stop answering the phone by name. They take different routes home. Their families ask them to quit. Many eventually do, and the people who leave are often those with the most experience and the most options elsewhere.

None of this requires a single dramatic incident to do damage. It works the way erosion works. That is why the response has to be structural: laws, funding and public support that make the job sustainable over years, not just emergency protection during a crisis.

Talking with a neighbour who doubts the count

There is one more thing readers can do that no legislature can: talk with people they know who distrust elections. Many Americans, especially on the right, came out of 2020 believing something went wrong. Most of them are not threatening anyone. They are worried, and they have heard a great deal of misinformation from sources they trust.

What tends to help is curiosity rather than argument. Ask what specifically worries them. Explain one concrete safeguard, such as the hand count audit, the bipartisan adjudication boards or the signature checks, and invite them to see it themselves by observing a count or signing up as a poll worker. Many election officials report that the most effective cure for suspicion is participation: skeptics who serve as poll workers or observers usually come away understanding how many checks there are.

The goal is not to win the conversation. It is to turn a suspicious neighbour into a participant, which helps the election and lowers the temperature for the people who run it.

What you can do

  • Become a poll worker. Your county election office, linked from the state voting guide, explains how to sign up. New workers make the system more resilient.
  • Ask your state lawmakers about protections. The representatives lookup finds your state legislators, their contact details and their latest votes. Ask whether your state protects election workers' home addresses and makes threats against them a specific crime.
  • Show up at the county meeting. When your county board certifies results, attend. A room full of calm neighbours supporting the law is a powerful thing.
  • Support voting-rights groups. The organizations directory lists nonprofits in every state that recruit poll workers and defend election officials.
  • Correct false claims you see. When someone shares a viral clip accusing a named election worker of fraud, ask for the investigation. Real people are on the other end.
  • Keep track of the fights. Our page on democracy and the rule of law follows threats, certification disputes and new laws.

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