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Guantanamo Bay and More Than Two Decades of Detention Without Trial
How a temporary island prison opened in January 2002 became a permanent one, why its military commissions stalled, and why closing it keeps failing.
On January 11, 2002, a military cargo plane landed at the US naval base on the southeastern tip of Cuba, and twenty men in orange jumpsuits, goggles, earmuffs and mittens were led off it and into open-air cages of chain-link fence and concrete slab. The place was called Camp X-Ray. It had been thrown together in a matter of days, and the photographs of kneeling, shackled prisoners went around the world almost immediately. Nobody involved described the arrangement as permanent. The base was chosen precisely because it seemed to sit nowhere: leased from Cuba since 1903, controlled entirely by the United States, and, the government's lawyers argued, outside the reach of American courts. More than two decades later the prison is still open, the men accused of planning the September 11 attacks have still not been tried, and the question that was supposed to be avoided by putting the camp on a Caribbean lease, which law applies here, has been argued in every branch of government without ever being finished.
In short: Guantanamo was built to hold prisoners beyond the reach of ordinary courts, and the Supreme Court spent the 2000s saying that could not be done. The military commissions created to try detainees have produced very few verdicts, and Congress has blocked every plan to close the prison by forbidding transfers to the United States.
A lease, a legal theory and a hurried camp
The base itself is older than most of the countries that now criticise it. The United States took a lease on Guantanamo Bay after the Spanish-American War, and a later treaty in 1934 made the arrangement indefinite unless both sides agreed to end it. Since the Cuban revolution, Havana has refused to cash the rent checks. That odd status, American control without American sovereignty, is the whole reason the prison ended up there.
In the weeks after the September 11 attacks, administration lawyers looked for a place where captured fighters from Afghanistan and elsewhere could be held and questioned without the procedural protections a federal courthouse would bring. Their reasoning ran like this: the Constitution's habeas corpus guarantee, the old right of a prisoner to make the government justify the detention before a judge, applied to US territory, and Guantanamo technically was not US territory. President George W. Bush also determined that the Geneva Conventions did not protect members of al Qaeda, and that Taliban fighters did not qualify as prisoners of war. The detainees were labelled "unlawful enemy combatants," a phrase chosen because it did not appear in the treaties.
So the camp opened, and it grew. Camp X-Ray was replaced within months by more permanent cell blocks, then by concrete prisons built to the standards of maximum-security facilities on the mainland. Over the years roughly 780 men passed through. Many were not picked up on any battlefield at all. Some were handed over in exchange for bounties offered in Pakistan and Afghanistan; others were simply in the wrong guesthouse. The military's own review processes eventually cleared large numbers of them for release, and most of the men ever held there were sent home or to third countries during the Bush years, not after.
Four Supreme Court cases that said the island was not lawless
The legal theory did not survive contact with the Supreme Court, though it took years to unwind.
In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees. The same day, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case about an American citizen captured in Afghanistan, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality opinion said that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of citizens. That line has become one of the most quoted in national-security law.
Congress and the administration responded by limiting the courts' role, and the Court answered again. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), it ruled that the military commissions the President had created on his own authority were not authorized by Congress and violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the provision that sets a floor of humane treatment in every armed conflict. Congress then passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which gave the commissions a statutory footing and tried to strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction over the detainees.
That set up Boumediene v. Bush (2008). By a vote of five to four, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court held that the detainees had a constitutional right to habeas corpus and that the substitute review Congress had offered was not an adequate replacement. The government could not, Kennedy reasoned, put people beyond the Constitution by choosing where to hold them while keeping complete control of the place.
The win was real, and in the years that followed federal judges ordered the release of a number of detainees after reviewing the evidence and finding it thin. But the victory had a ceiling. The appeals court in Washington later read the government's detention power broadly and gave its intelligence reports a presumption of regularity, and the stream of successful habeas petitions slowed to a trickle. The right to ask a judge turned out to be very different from the right to a trial.
How the military commissions work, and why they barely do
A military commission is a wartime court run by the Defense Department rather than the judiciary. It has a military judge, a jury of officers, prosecutors in uniform and defense lawyers, some military and some civilian. Its rules on evidence are looser than in a federal courtroom, particularly on hearsay and on classified material.
On paper this was supposed to be faster. In practice the opposite happened. The commissions were rebuilt several times, after Hamdan, after the 2006 Act, and again in a revised Military Commissions Act in 2009 that tightened rules on statements obtained through coercion. Every rebuild reset arguments about procedure. Judges rotated. Defense teams discovered that rooms where they met their clients had been monitored. Fights over what classified material the defense could see, and how, consumed years of pretrial hearings.
Underneath all of it sat the problem the government created for itself between 2002 and 2006: the CIA's secret prisons and what the agency called enhanced interrogation. Several of the most important defendants, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, were held in those sites and subjected to techniques that included waterboarding before being moved to Guantanamo. The Senate Intelligence Committee's study of the program, whose executive summary was released in December 2014, documented the methods in detail. Any trial of those men has to deal with whether anything they said can be used, what the defense can learn about how they were treated, and whether the treatment itself taints the case. Those questions are the reason the September 11 prosecution is still, after more than a decade of hearings, in its pretrial phase.
The commissions have produced only a small number of convictions, and several of those came through guilty pleas. Some were later overturned on appeal. In 2024, prosecutors reached plea agreements with Mohammed and two co-defendants that would have taken the death penalty off the table in exchange for guilty pleas; the Secretary of Defense withdrew the deals within days, and the dispute over whether he had the power to do so went to the courts. Meanwhile the federal courts that the government decided not to use have convicted hundreds of people on terrorism-related charges since 2001, including the plotters of several attacks.
The strongest case for keeping it, and the answer
People who defend the prison are not, for the most part, arguing for cruelty. Here is their case at its best. Some of the remaining detainees are genuinely dangerous and cannot be tried, because the evidence against them is classified, came from foreign partners who will not allow it in court, or was obtained in ways a court would reject. Releasing them is a risk the government has a duty to avoid, and some former detainees did return to militant activity after transfer. Holding enemy fighters for the duration of a conflict is lawful under the laws of war; prisoners of war in the Second World War were not given trials either. And bringing detainees to prisons on the mainland, they say, would make those communities targets and hand the detainees new legal rights.
Each piece deserves an answer, and here is ours. Wartime detention is lawful when it is tied to an actual conflict with a definable end, and the conflict that justified it has changed beyond recognition; the war in Afghanistan that most of these men were captured in ended in 2021. Prisoners of war have the protections of the Geneva Conventions, which the government spent years denying these men. Federal prisons on the mainland already hold people convicted of terrorism, including some of the most notorious, without incident to the towns around them. And the reason so much evidence is unusable is the torture program itself: the inability to try these men is a product of decisions made by the government, not a fact of nature. The cost of the arrangement is enormous by any measure, since a prison with a few dozen inmates or fewer still needs guards, lawyers, courtrooms and a hospital flown in to an island.
There is also a cost that does not show up in budgets. The orange jumpsuit became an image used in propaganda by armed groups for years, and allies with whom the United States shares intelligence have hesitated to hand over suspects to a system they regard as outside the law. The rule of law is a national-security asset; it is part of why other governments trust American courts.
Why every attempt to close it has failed
On January 22, 2009, his second full day in office, President Barack Obama signed an executive order directing that the prison be closed within a year. It did not happen, and the reasons are instructive.
The first obstacle was Congress. Beginning around 2010, lawmakers from both parties put provisions into annual defense authorization and spending bills forbidding the use of funds to transfer any Guantanamo detainee to the United States for any purpose, including trial. Those riders have been renewed year after year. They made it legally impossible to move the remaining men to a federal prison or a federal courtroom, which is the only realistic way to close the camp and still hold or try anyone.
The second obstacle was the plan itself. Obama's team proposed moving detainees to a prison in Illinois, and the local politics turned fast. A plan to try the September 11 defendants in a federal courthouse in Manhattan, announced in 2009, collapsed under opposition from New York officials. Democrats were not united; a number voted for the transfer bans. Progressives should be honest about this: the issue was treated as a political loser, and the party that said it wanted to close the prison often lacked the votes or the will to do it.
The third obstacle was simple geography. Even men cleared for release by multiple security reviews could not be sent home if home was Yemen, at war and without a functioning government able to monitor them. Finding third countries willing to take them required patient diplomacy, carried out by an office at the State Department dedicated to the task. When that office was closed, as it was during the first Trump administration, transfers stopped.
The population fell anyway, slowly, through transfers under Obama and later under President Joe Biden. By early 2025 fewer than twenty men remained, and some of them had been cleared for transfer but were still waiting for somewhere to go. Then the base found a new use. In January 2025 President Donald Trump directed the military to expand the separate migrant facility on the base to hold people detained in the immigration system, and migrants were flown there from the mainland. That move, and the legal challenges it prompted, are a reminder that a place built to be outside the normal rules does not stay limited to the people it was built for. If the theory works for one group, it is available for the next.
The people the camp leaves behind
It is easy to discuss Guantanamo entirely in the language of statutes. The people involved are harder to file. There were the men held for more than a decade without charge and released with no apology, some to countries they had never lived in, where they did not speak the language. There are the families of the nearly three thousand people killed on September 11, many of whom have attended hearings for years and have waited for a verdict that the system has not delivered. Some of them supported the plea deals because they wanted an ending; others opposed them because they wanted a trial and a possible death sentence. Both groups have been failed by the same machinery.
There are also the service members, the guards, the military lawyers and judges, who have done difficult work inside an arrangement they did not design. Several military prosecutors resigned over the years rather than proceed with cases they considered compromised, and military defense lawyers have fought their own government in court with real tenacity. The uniformed lawyers on both sides of the commissions have often been more insistent on legal process than the politicians who created the system.
This is a place where a progressive case and a conservative case for the rule of law converge. Limited government, due process and suspicion of unchecked executive power are not left-wing values. Republicans and Democrats who have served in the military, including several who commanded troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, have called for closing the prison. Opinion polls have moved back and forth, but the arguments that persuade people across lines tend to be about cost, about effectiveness and about whether a country that prides itself on its courts should keep a place designed to avoid them.
What closing it would actually take
Our view is that the prison should close, and that closing it is a legislative task more than an executive one. That means a few specific things.
First, the transfer bans in the annual defense bill have to come out or be narrowed. Because they ride on must-pass legislation, they draw little attention, and they are renewed by inertia. A new majority in Congress, sworn in on January 3, 2027, will write a defense authorization bill in its first year; that bill is the place to watch.
Second, the men who have been cleared need somewhere to go, which means funding and staffing the diplomatic work of finding host countries and monitoring arrangements.
Third, the remaining prosecutions need a forum that can reach verdicts. Federal courts have shown they can handle terrorism cases. If the commissions are to continue for the cases already in them, they need the resources and political backing to finish rather than restart.
Finally, Congress should make clear in law that the base cannot be used as a holding site to avoid the rights people would have on the mainland, whoever they are and whatever they are accused of.
None of this will happen because of a single executive order. That was the lesson of 2009.
What you can do
- Ask your members of Congress where they stand on the transfer restrictions. The language sits in the National Defense Authorization Act every year. Our representatives lookup gives you your House member's and senators' phone numbers and contact forms, along with their latest votes, so you can ask a specific question about a specific bill rather than a general one.
- Follow the defense bill as it moves. The House and Senate votes on the annual defense authorization and on any amendment touching Guantanamo will show up on the Congress votes and bills page, which is the fastest way to see who voted how.
- Keep track of the legal fights. Questions about detention, habeas corpus and executive power keep reaching the Supreme Court in different forms. Court Watch carries this term's opinions with the Court's own summaries and the emergency docket, which is where fast-moving detention cases often land first.
- Support groups doing the legal and human work. Civil liberties and human rights organizations have represented detainees for two decades and are now challenging the immigration detention on the base. Find ones near you in the organizations directory, under civil rights and legal aid.
- Read more on the rule of law. Our topic page on democracy and the rule of law collects current reporting on executive power, courts and due process, including stories about the base as they break.