Blog

Homer Plessy's Train Ticket and Justice Harlan's Lonely Dissent

How Homer Plessy's planned arrest on a New Orleans train in 1892 led to the 1896 ruling that blessed segregation for six decades, and why Justice Harlan's dissent is still fought over today.

On June 7, 1892, a 30-year-old shoemaker named Homer Plessy bought a first-class ticket at the Press Street depot in New Orleans for a short trip north across Lake Pontchartrain to Covington, on the East Louisiana Railroad. He took a seat in the car reserved for white passengers. Plessy let the conductor know that under Louisiana's law he counted as colored, and he refused to move to the other car. A private detective, on board by arrangement, arrested him, and he was taken off the train. Very little about this was spontaneous. The detective had been hired for the purpose, the railroad had been told in advance, and a committee of New Orleans citizens had spent months planning exactly this confrontation. Plessy, whose ancestry was mostly European and who could pass for white, had been chosen precisely because his case would show how arbitrary the law's racial lines were. The organizers expected to lose in Louisiana. They were aiming for the Supreme Court.

In short: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) upheld a Louisiana law requiring separate railway cars for Black and white passengers, giving constitutional cover to the doctrine of "separate but equal" until Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. The case was a carefully planned challenge by a New Orleans civil rights group. Justice John Marshall Harlan's solitary dissent became the most famous in American law, and its meaning is still contested in today's fights over race and the Constitution.

The Comité des Citoyens

New Orleans in 1890 was not like the rest of the South. It had a large and long-established community of free people of color, many of them French-speaking Creoles, who had owned property, published newspapers and served in public office during Reconstruction. When Reconstruction ended and white supremacist governments regained control across the South, that community watched its rights being taken away one law at a time.

In 1890 Louisiana passed the Separate Car Act, requiring railroads to provide "equal but separate" accommodations for white and colored passengers and making it a crime to sit in the wrong car. A group of Creole activists, lawyers and businessmen formed the Comité des Citoyens, the Citizens' Committee, to challenge it. They raised money, hired lawyers, and planned test cases.

Their lead counsel was Albion Tourgée, a white lawyer and novelist from upstate New York who had been a Union soldier, a Reconstruction-era judge in North Carolina and one of the most outspoken white critics of the Jim Crow laws spreading through the South. He worked on the case without a fee. Tourgée's legal strategy had a sharp edge: by choosing a plaintiff who looked white, the committee could force the courts to explain how a state could decide who belonged in which car, and on what basis.

There was an earlier test. In 1892, before Plessy, a man named Daniel Desdunes was arrested on a train traveling between states. A Louisiana court ruled that the Separate Car Act could not apply to interstate passengers, because only Congress could regulate interstate commerce. That was a narrow win. The committee needed a case on a train that stayed inside Louisiana, which is why Plessy's ticket was for Covington.

Judge Ferguson's ruling and the road to Washington

Plessy's lawyers argued in the Orleans Parish criminal court that the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and, they argued, its badges, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Judge John Howard Ferguson rejected the challenge. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with him. Plessy took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was captioned with the trial judge's name, which is how a little-known New Orleans judge became one half of one of the most infamous case names in history.

It took four years to get a decision. During those years, the South moved quickly. States passed more segregation laws, and the federal government did little to stop them. By the time the justices heard argument, the direction of the country was not in much doubt.

Separate but equal

The Court decided the case on May 18, 1896. The vote was 7-1, with one justice not participating. Justice Henry Billings Brown of Michigan wrote the majority opinion.

Brown's reasoning had three parts. First, he said the Thirteenth Amendment was not involved because a law separating the races did not reestablish slavery. Second, he said the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to secure the equality of the two races before the law, but not to abolish distinctions based on color or to enforce what he called social equality. States could make reasonable regulations based on established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and separating the races on trains was, in his view, reasonable. Third, and most notoriously, he rejected the argument that segregation stamped Black citizens with a badge of inferiority. If that was so, he wrote in substance, it was only because Black Americans chose to read it that way.

That last line of reasoning is the one later generations found most unforgivable. It took a law written to humiliate and told the people it humiliated that the problem was their own sensitivity.

Notice what the ruling did and did not say. It did not require segregation. It permitted it, as long as the accommodations were equal. In practice, the equal part was ignored almost everywhere for the next half century. Black schools, hospitals, parks and train cars were routinely and drastically worse. Separate but equal became separate, period.

The dissent from Kentucky

The lone dissenter was Justice John Marshall Harlan, an unlikely hero. He came from a slaveholding family in Kentucky, had opposed the Thirteenth Amendment early in his political career, and had fought on the Union side in the Civil War while defending slavery in Kentucky. Over the next decades his views changed profoundly, and by the time he reached the Court he had become its most consistent defender of the Reconstruction amendments. In 1883, he had been the only dissenter when the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.

His Plessy dissent is remembered for one sentence above all: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." He went further. He predicted that the decision would prove, in time, to be as harmful as the Dred Scott decision. He wrote that everyone knew the real purpose of the law was not to keep Black people out of white cars but to keep them out of cars occupied by white people, in other words, to mark them as inferior. And he warned that the seeds of race hate planted by such laws would harm the whole country.

There is an uncomfortable passage in the same dissent that honest readers should not skip. Harlan contrasted Black Americans, who were citizens, with Chinese immigrants, describing the Chinese as a race so different from Americans that the law did not permit them to become citizens, and noted that a Chinese person could ride in the white car while a Black citizen could not. Two years later he joined the dissent in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, which would have denied citizenship to the American-born children of Chinese parents. The great dissenter was a man of his time on some questions, ahead of it on others.

Why the plaintiff's skin mattered

The committee's choice of plaintiff was a legal argument in itself, and it is worth slowing down to see how.

Louisiana's law did not define who was white and who was colored. It left that to conductors, who had to make the call on sight, under threat of a fine if they got it wrong. Plessy's lawyers argued that this was both absurd and unconstitutional. If a man who looked white could be removed from a car because of a great-grandparent, then race was not a fact the state was observing but a status it was assigning. And they made a further, more daring argument: that a reputation as a white man was a kind of property, worth money in a society that rewarded whiteness, and that the state could not strip it away without due process.

That second argument is uncomfortable to read now, because it accepted the premise that whiteness was valuable in order to attack the law. But it was a shrewd attempt to speak in terms the Court of the 1890s respected, since that Court was far more protective of property than of equality.

The majority brushed the point aside. Brown wrote that the question of who counted as white or colored was a matter for each state to decide under its own laws. In one sentence, the Court left the drawing of racial lines to the very legislatures that were drawing them to exclude. Over the next decades, states wrote and rewrote those definitions, some of them by fractions of ancestry, others by the so-called one-drop rule. The whole elaborate machinery of racial classification in the Jim Crow South rested on the permission Brown granted here.

The committee's strategy failed in court. As a piece of public argument, though, it succeeded in a way that outlived everyone involved. It forced the law to show that its categories were invented, and every later generation that read the case could see it.

Sixty years under Plessy

The decision gave constitutional permission to an entire legal order. Over the following decades Southern states and many towns elsewhere segregated schools, hospitals, cemeteries, water fountains, courtrooms, theaters and public transit. Segregation laws were paired with poll taxes, literacy tests and white primaries that stripped Black citizens of the vote, so that the people subject to these laws had almost no way to change them through elections.

The NAACP's legal strategy, led for years by Charles Hamilton Houston and then by Thurgood Marshall, chipped away at Plessy by taking it at its word. If the states had to provide equal facilities, then the lawyers would prove, case by case, that the facilities were not equal, starting with graduate and law schools where the inequality was easiest to show. Those victories built toward the direct challenge. On May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court unanimously held that in the field of public education, separate but equal has no place, because separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

Homer Plessy did not live to see it. After the Supreme Court ruled against him, he pleaded guilty in 1897 and paid a fine of $25. He went back to work, later selling insurance, and died in 1925. In January 2022, Louisiana's governor, John Bel Edwards, granted him a posthumous pardon, at a ceremony attended by descendants of both Plessy and Judge Ferguson, who had become friends and started a foundation together to teach the history of the case.

Who owns the color-blind sentence

Harlan's most famous line is now argued over by both sides of the debate about race and law, and that argument deserves a fair statement.

Conservative justices and advocates read the sentence as a principle of strict neutrality: the government should never classify people by race, for any reason, including to remedy past discrimination. Chief Justice Roberts, in the 2023 decision ending race-conscious college admissions in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, drew on this tradition, and Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence relied on Harlan's dissent at length. On this view, Harlan was right that the Constitution forbids racial classifications, full stop, and affirmative action breaks the same rule Plessy did.

The progressive reading starts from the rest of the dissent. Harlan was not objecting to the use of race in the abstract. He was objecting to a law whose purpose and effect was to create a caste system, to stamp one group as inferior. The sentence that follows the color-blind line is about classes among citizens, and the paragraph around it is about domination. On this view, a measure meant to include people who were shut out does the opposite of what the Separate Car Act did, and Harlan's principle is against caste, not against noticing it.

Here is our view. The text supports reading Harlan as an enemy of caste first. But progressives should take the color-blind ideal seriously rather than dismiss it, because it speaks to something many Americans of every race feel deeply: the wish to be treated as individuals. The most durable remedies for inequality are often ones that work through class, place and opportunity, such as investing in under-resourced schools and neighborhoods, which can win broad support while still closing gaps that history created.

What you can do

  • Follow today's cases on race, voting and equal protection on the Court Watch page, which publishes the Court's own summaries of each opinion.
  • Read ongoing coverage of civil rights law and organizing at the racial justice topic page.
  • Protect the vote that segregation was built to take away. Check registration deadlines, ID rules and early voting in your state on the voting page.
  • Find civil rights organizations, voting rights groups and local history projects near you in the organizations directory.

Homer Plessy bought a ticket for a ride of a few dozen miles. He never reached Covington that day, and the law he challenged stood for nearly sixty years. But the committee that sent him knew something that is still true: when a law cannot survive being explained out loud, the first step is to make someone explain it.

Latest on this topic