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How a Caucus Uses Leverage: The Progressives and the 2021 Infrastructure Vote
Progressives tied the 2021 infrastructure bill to a larger social bill, then let it pass on November 5. What the two-track bargain won, what it lost, and what it teaches a new majority.
It was well past eleven on the night of Friday, November 5, 2021, when the House finally voted. The bill on the floor was the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which the Senate had passed in August with nineteen Republican votes: roads, bridges, transit, rail, water pipes, broadband and the electric grid. It should have been easy. It had been held up for months by the Democrats' own left wing, which had refused to vote for it until the House also passed a much larger bill covering child care, climate, health care and paid leave. That night the progressives let it go. A group of moderate Democrats issued a written promise to vote for the larger bill later in the month, once the Congressional Budget Office had produced its cost estimates. The infrastructure bill passed 228 to 206, with thirteen Republicans voting yes and six progressive Democrats voting no. The president signed it ten days later. Whether the progressives had played their hand well or been outplayed is still argued in Democratic circles, and the answer matters for 2027.
In short: In 2021, the Congressional Progressive Caucus held the bipartisan infrastructure bill hostage to a larger social spending bill, a strategy called the two-track approach. The infrastructure bill passed in November 2021; the larger bill passed the House and then died in the Senate, before a smaller version became the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. The episode is the clearest modern lesson in what a caucus's leverage can and cannot buy.
The setup: two bills and one theory
When Joe Biden took office in January 2021, Democrats had the narrowest possible Senate majority, fifty seats plus the vice president's tiebreaking vote, and a House majority of only a few seats. They passed the American Rescue Plan in March 2021 through budget reconciliation, which avoids the filibuster.
The president's broader economic program came in two pieces. One was a bipartisan infrastructure deal, negotiated with a group of senators of both parties, that focused on physical infrastructure. It could get sixty votes in the Senate. The other was a much larger package of social and climate spending, later called Build Back Better, that Republicans opposed and that could pass only through reconciliation with every Democratic senator.
The progressive theory was simple. Moderate Democrats and some Republicans wanted the infrastructure bill. Progressives wanted the larger bill. If the two moved separately, moderates could pass infrastructure with Republican help and then lose interest in the larger bill, which needed every Democratic vote in the Senate, including the two most conservative, Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona. So progressives would refuse to vote for infrastructure until the larger bill was ready to pass too. Their votes on the first bill were the leverage for the second.
For a while, the president seemed to endorse this. In June 2021 he said he would not sign the infrastructure bill unless the larger one came with it, a remark he walked back within days after Republicans objected.
How the leverage worked in practice
Pramila Jayapal of Washington, who chaired the Congressional Progressive Caucus, made the strategy concrete. In the late summer, House leaders promised a group of moderates a vote on infrastructure by September 27. As the date approached, Jayapal said enough caucus members would vote against the bill to sink it if it came up alone. Speaker Nancy Pelosi postponed the vote, then postponed it again.
This was the high point of the caucus's power. For the first time in its history, it had stopped a bill that the president, the Speaker and the Senate wanted. It had done it by acting as a disciplined bloc, which it had spent the previous two years organizing to become.
The leverage forced negotiation on the larger bill. The original proposal had been described at around three and a half trillion dollars over ten years. Manchin and Sinema said that was far too much. Over October, the package was cut roughly in half, and some of its biggest pieces, including free community college and a clean electricity program that would have paid utilities to switch from fossil fuels, were dropped or rewritten.
By early November, progressives faced a choice. They could keep holding infrastructure and risk losing both bills, or accept the moderates' written promise and let infrastructure go. Most of the caucus took the deal. Six members did not: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Jamaal Bowman, Cori Bush, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib, who argued that letting infrastructure pass would destroy the leverage for the larger bill.
What happened next
On November 19, 2021, the House passed the larger Build Back Better bill, 220 to 213. The moderates had kept their written promise.
But the promise could only bind the House. In the Senate, Manchin had never committed to the bill. On December 19, 2021, he announced on a Sunday television interview that he could not support it. The expanded monthly child tax credit, which had been in effect since July and had lowered child poverty, expired at the end of December. With one senator's vote, the larger bill was dead.
It came back in a different form. In the summer of 2022, Manchin and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer negotiated a much smaller package, renamed the Inflation Reduction Act. It included the largest climate investment in American history, mostly through tax credits for clean energy, the first authority for Medicare to negotiate prices for some prescription drugs, a cap on out-of-pocket drug costs for Medicare recipients and an extension of the enhanced Affordable Care Act tax credits through 2025. It passed the Senate 51 to 50 with the vice president breaking the tie, and the president signed it in August 2022.
Child care, paid leave, universal pre-kindergarten, home care for the elderly and disabled and the child tax credit expansion were gone.
What the infrastructure law actually paid for
It is worth pausing on the bill that progressives held hostage, because it was not a small thing.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act was described as about $1.2 trillion over several years, of which roughly $550 billion was new spending beyond what Congress would ordinarily have provided for highways and transit. It was the largest federal investment in physical infrastructure in decades. It included about $65 billion for broadband, aimed at bringing high-speed internet to rural areas, tribal lands and low-income neighborhoods that private companies had skipped. It included money to replace lead service lines, the pipes that carry drinking water into older homes, a priority that rose sharply after the water crisis in Flint, Michigan. It funded bridge repairs, transit, passenger rail, airports, ports, electric vehicle charging and upgrades to the power grid.
In other words, many of the things progressives wanted were inside the bill they were refusing to pass. That was part of what made the strategy so painful. Every week of delay was also a week of delay for lead pipe replacement and rural broadband. Supporters of the two-track approach understood that; they bet that a few months of delay was worth the chance to pass child care, paid leave and climate investments on a much larger scale.
The bill's bipartisan origins also mattered. It had been negotiated in the Senate by a group that included Republicans such as Rob Portman of Ohio and Democrats such as Sinema, and the nineteen Republican senators who voted for it included the minority leader, Mitch McConnell. Progressives were, in effect, holding a bipartisan achievement hostage to a partisan one. Critics in the center said that was exactly backward. Progressives answered that the bipartisan bill left out most of what working families needed, and that only leverage would get the rest.
The case that progressives lost
The critics, including the six who voted no, make a strong case. Once infrastructure passed, the only people who still needed the larger bill were progressives, and Manchin no longer had any reason to deal. The leverage existed only as long as the infrastructure bill was hostage. Releasing it on a promise from moderates in the House, when the real obstacle was a senator in the Senate, traded hard leverage for a soft commitment from the wrong people.
They also argue the strategy was weak from the start. Manchin repeatedly said he would not be pressured, and the infrastructure bill was a priority for him, not a threat to him. A hostage only works if the other side values it. Manchin had already voted for the infrastructure bill in the Senate. If the House never passed it, his reputation as a dealmaker suffered, but his opposition to the larger bill did not become any more expensive.
The case that progressives won more than it looks
The defenders have a case too, and I think it is the stronger one, though reasonable progressives disagree.
Without the two-track strategy, there is a real chance the larger bill would never have been negotiated at all. Holding infrastructure forced the White House, the Speaker and the moderates to spend months on the social bill and kept it alive long enough to become a negotiated framework with real numbers. When Manchin later returned to the table in 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act was built from pieces that had been drafted, scored and argued over during the 2021 fight. Climate policy, drug pricing and health subsidies, the core of the 2022 law, survived because the caucus had kept them moving.
There is also a point about what was realistic. With fifty senators, any bill that needed reconciliation needed Manchin. No amount of House leverage could produce a fifty-first vote that did not exist. The caucus could shape how much of its agenda got a hearing; it could not change the arithmetic of the Senate.
So here is the balance as I see it. The caucus showed it could stop its own party's priorities, which earned it a seat at every later negotiation. It kept the core of a historic climate and health law alive. It lost the family-support provisions that would have most directly helped working parents, and it lost them to a single senator whom its leverage could not reach. That is neither a triumph nor a failure. It is what leverage looks like in a fifty-fifty Senate.
It is also fair to note what the six dissenters were warning about and how events treated them. Their argument was that a promise from moderates in the House was worth nothing if the Senate never acted, and in December 2021 that is exactly what happened. The majority of the caucus answered that holding out longer would have killed infrastructure without saving the larger bill. Both groups predicted part of what came next, which may be the most useful thing to remember about strategy under uncertainty.
Lessons for a Democratic Congress in 2027
The next Democratic majority will be in a different position. It will control both chambers but not the White House, so its major bills will meet a veto rather than a Manchin. The lessons transfer anyway.
Leverage works only on someone who wants what you hold. Before a faction holds a bill hostage, it should ask whether the people it needs to move value that bill at all.
Get commitments from the people who actually decide. A promise from one chamber cannot bind the other, and a promise from moderates cannot bind a senator who never made one.
Keep the big ideas drafted and ready. The 2022 law happened because the 2021 work existed. A majority that writes, scores and passes ambitious bills in 2027 and 2028, even if they are vetoed, is building the shelf for the next time Democrats hold the presidency too.
And know the value of a partial win. The infrastructure law has funded bridge repairs, lead pipe removal, transit and broadband in red and blue states alike. Plenty of Republican members who voted against it have since appeared at ribbon cuttings for projects it paid for. That is not a reason to stop fighting for more. It is a reason not to dismiss what was won.
The parents who were left out
The people most directly affected by the end of the larger bill were families with children. For six months in 2021, most families received a monthly payment from the expanded child tax credit, and research by several groups found child poverty fell sharply during that period. When the payments stopped, it rose again. Parents who had used the money for groceries, rent, school clothes or child care did not follow the argument over two-track strategies. They noticed that the payments ended.
Those families live in every kind of district, rural and urban, Democratic and Republican. A new majority that wants to keep faith with them will need not just leverage but a plan for winning votes in the places where they live.
What you can do
The next round of fights over family support and public investment will start with the new Congress. A few ways to be ready:
- Read about the people who led the progressive bloc in 2021 and those leading it now on the progressive leaders topic page.
- See the Progressive Caucus and the Democratic leadership side by side on the Progressive Caucus page, and look up which of your members belong.
- Check where your representative stood on big party votes, and where they broke ranks, on the party unity page.
- Look at the bills that passed with support from both parties, like the 2021 infrastructure law, on the common-ground page.
- Tell your members which family-support policies you want back on the table in 2027 through the representatives lookup.